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Abstract
Animals living in groups make movement decisions that depend, among other factors, on social interactions with other
group members. Our present understanding of social rules in animal collectives is mainly based on empirical fits to
observations, with less emphasis in obtaining first-principles approaches that allow their derivation. Here we show that
patterns of collective decisions can be derived from the basic ability of animals to make probabilistic estimations in the
presence of uncertainty. We build a decision-making model with two stages: Bayesian estimation and probabilistic
matching. In the first stage, each animal makes a Bayesian estimation of which behavior is best to perform taking into
account personal information about the environment and social information collected by observing the behaviors of other
animals. In the probability matching stage, each animal chooses a behavior with a probability equal to the Bayesian-
estimated probability that this behavior is the most appropriate one. This model derives very simple rules of interaction in
animal collectives that depend only on two types of reliability parameters, one that each animal assigns to the other animals
and another given by the quality of the non-social information. We test our model by obtaining theoretically a rich set of
observed collective patterns of decisions in three-spined sticklebacks, Gasterosteus aculeatus, a shoaling fish species. The
quantitative link shown between probabilistic estimation and collective rules of behavior allows a better contact with other
fields such as foraging, mate selection, neurobiology and psychology, and gives predictions for experiments directly testing
the relationship between estimation and collective behavior.
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Introduction
Animals need to make decisions without certainty in which
option is best. This uncertainty is due to the ambiguity of sensory
data but also to limited processing capabilities, and is an intrinsic
and general property of the representation that animals can build
about the world. A general way to make decisions in uncertain
situations is to make probabilistic estimations [1,2]. There is
evidence that animals use probabilistic estimations, for example in
the early stages of sensory perception [3–11], sensory-motor
transformations [12–14], learning [15–17] and behaviors in an
ecological context such as strategies for food patch exploitation
[18–20] and mate selection [21], among others [13,17,21,22].
An additional source of information about the environment may
come from the behavior of other animals (social information) [23–
28]. This information can have different degrees of ambiguity. In
particular cases, the behavior of conspecifics directly reveals
environmental characteristics (for example, food encountered by
another individual informs about the quality of a food patch).
Cases in which social information correlates well with the
environmental characteristic of interest have been very well
studied [29–37]. But in most cases social information is ambiguous
and potentially misleading [26,38]. In spite of this ambiguity, there
is evidence that in some cases such as predator avoidance [39,40]
and mate choice [41], animals use this kind of information.
Social animals have a continuous flow of information about the
environment coming from the behaviours of other animals. It is
therefore possible that social animals use it at all times, making
probabilistic estimations to counteract its ambiguity. If this is the
case, estimation of the environment using both non-social and
social information might be a major determinant of the structure
of animal collectives. In order to test this hypothesis, we have
developed a Bayesian decision-making model that includes both
personal and social information, that naturally weights them
according to their reliability in order to get a better estimate of the
environment. All members of the group can then use these
improved estimations to make better decisions, and collective
patterns of decisions then emerge from these individuals
interacting through their perceptual systems.
We show that this model derives social rules that economically
explain detailed experiments of decision-making in animal groups
[42,43]. This approach should complement the empirical
approach used in the study of animal groups [42–47], finding
which mathematical functions should correspond to each
experimental problem and to propose experiments relating
estimation and collective motion. The Bayesian structure of our
model also builds a bridge between the field of collective behavior
and other fields of animal behavior, such as optimal foraging
theory [18–22] and others [21,22]. Further, it explicitly includes in
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a natural way different cognitive abilities, making more direct
contact with neurobiology and psychology [3–10,17].
Results
Estimation model
We derived a model in which each individual decides from an
estimation of which behavior is best to perform. These behaviors
can be to go to one of several different places, to choose among
some behaviors like forage, explore or run away, or any other set
of options. For clarity, here we particularize to the case of choosing
the best of two spatial locations, x and y (see Text S1 for more than
two options). ‘Best’ may correspond to the safest, the one with
highest food density or most interesting for any other reasons. We
assume that each decision maker uses in the estimation of the best
location both non-social and social information. Non-social
information may include sensory information about the environ-
ment (i.e. shelter properties, potential predators, food items),
memory of previous experiences and internal states. Social
information consists of the behaviors performed by other
decision-makers. Each individual estimates the probability that
each location, say y, is the best one, using its non-social
information (C) and the behavior of the other individuals (B),
P(Y jC,B), ð1Þ
where Y stands for ‘y is the best location’.
P(X jC,B)~1{P(Y jC,B), because there are only two locations
to choose from. We can compute the probability in Eq. 1 using
Bayes’ theorem,
P(Y jC,B)~ P(BjY ,C)P(Y jC)
P(BjX ,C)P(X jC)zP(BjY ,C)P(Y jC) : ð2Þ
By simply dividing numerator and denominator by the numerator
we find an interesting structure,
P(Y jC,B)~ 1
1zaS
, ð3Þ
where
a~
P(X jC)
P(Y jC) ð4Þ
and
S~
P(BjX ,C)
P(BjY ,C) : ð5Þ
Note that a does not contain any social information so it can be
understood as the ‘‘non-social term’’ of the estimation. We can
also understand S as the ‘‘social term’’ because it contains all the
social information, although is also depends on the non-social
information C. The non-social term a is the likelihood ratio for the
two options given only the non-social information. This kind of
likelihood ratio is the basis of Bayesian decision-making in the
absence of social information [5,11–14]. Eq. 3 now tells us that
this well known term interacts with the social term S simply
through multiplication.
We are seeking a model based on probabilistic estimation that
can simultaneously give us insight into social decision-making and
fit experimental data. For this reason we simplify the model by
assuming that the focal individual does not make use of the
correlations among the behaviour of others, but instead assumes
their behaviours to be independent of each other. This is a strong
hypothesis but allows us to derive simple explicit expressions with
important insights. The section ‘Model including dependencies’ at
the end of Results shows that this assumption gives a very good
approximation to a more complete model that takes into account
these correlations.
The assumption of independence translates in that the
probability of a given set of behaviors is just the product of the
probabilities of the individual behaviors. We apply it to the
probabilities needed to compute S in Eq. 5, getting
P(BjY ,C)~Z P
N
i~1
P(bijY ,C), ð6Þ
where B is the set of all the behaviors of the other N animals at the
time the focal individual chooses, B~ bif gNi~1, and bi denotes the
behavior of one of them, individual i. Z is a combinatorial term
counting the number of possible decision sequences that lead to
the set of behaviors B, that will cancel out in the next step.
Substituting Eq. 6 and the corresponding expression for P(BjX ,C)
into Eq. 5, we get
S~ P
N
i~1
P(bijX ,C)
P(bijY ,C) : ð7Þ
Instead of an expression in terms of as many behaviors as
individuals, it may be more useful to consider a discrete set of
behavioral classes. For example, in our two-choice example, these
behavioral classes may be ‘go to x’ (denoted bx), ‘go to y’ (by) and
‘remain undecided’ (bu). Frequently, these behavioral classes (or
simply ‘behaviors’) will be directly related to the choices, so that
each behavior will consist of choosing one option. For example,
behaviors bx and by are directly related to choices x and y,
respectively. But there may be behaviors not related to any option
as the case of indecision, bu, or related to choices in an indirect
way. These behaviors can still be informative because they may be
more consistent with one of the options being better than the other
(for example, indecision may increase when there is a predator, so
Author Summary
Animals need to act on uncertain data and with limited
cognitive abilities to survive. It is well known that our
sensory and sensorimotor processing uses probabilistic
estimation as a means to counteract these limitations.
Indeed, the way animals learn, forage or select mates is
well explained by probabilistic estimation. Social animals
have an interesting new opportunity since the behavior of
other members of the group provides a continuous flow of
indirect information about the environment. This informa-
tion can be used to improve their estimations of
environmental factors. Here we show that this simple idea
can derive basic interaction rules that animals use for
decisions in social contexts. In particular, we show that the
patterns of choice of Gasterosteus aculeatus correspond
very well to probabilistic estimation using the social
information. The link found between estimation and
collective behavior should help to design experiments of
collective behavior testing for the importance of estima-
tion as a basic property of how brains work.
Bayesian Collective Behavior
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the presence of undecided individuals may bias the decision
against the place where the non-social information suggests the
presence of a predator). Let us consider L different behavioral
classes, fbkgLk~1. We do not here consider individual differences
for animals performing the same behavior (say, behavior b1), so
they have the same probabilities P(b1jX ,C) and P(b1jY ,C).
Thus, if for example the n1 first individuals are performing
behavior b1, we have that P
n1
i~1
P(bijX ,C)
P(bijY ,C)~
P(b1jX ,C)
P(b1jY ,C)
 n1
.
We can then write Eq. 7 as
S~ P
L
k~1
s
nk
k , ð8Þ
where nk is the number of individuals performing behavior bk, and
sk~
P(bkjX ,C)
P(bkjY ,C)
: ð9Þ
The term sk is the probability that an individual performs behavior
bk when x is the best option, over the probability that it performs
the same behavior when y is the best choice. The higher sk the
more reliably behavior bk indicates that x is better than y, so we
can understand sk as the reliability parameter of behavior bk. If
sk~?, observing behavior bk indicates with complete certainty
that x is the best option, while for sk~1 behavior bk gives no
information. For skv1, observing behavior bk favors y as the best
option, and more so the closer it is to 0. Note that P(bkjX ,C) and
P(bkjY ,C) are not the actual probabilities of performing behavior
bk, but estimates of these probabilities that the deciding animal
uses to assess the reliability of the other decision-makers. These
estimates may be ‘hard-wired’ as a result of evolutionary
adaptation, but may also be subject to change due to learning.
To summarize, using Eqs. 3 and 8, the probability that y is the
best choice, given both social and non-social information is
P(Y jC,B)~ 1za P
L
k~1
s
nk
k
 {1
, ð10Þ
with a in Eq. 4 and sk in Eq. 9.
Decision rule: Probability matching
We have so far only considered the perceptual stage of decision-
making, in which the deciding individual estimates the probability
that each behavior is the best one. Now it must decide according
to this estimation. A simple decision rule would be to go to y when
P(Y jC,B) is above a certain threshold. This rule maximizes the
amount of correct choices when the probabilities do not change
[48], but is not consistent with the experimental data considered in
this paper. Applying this deterministic rule strictly, without any
noise sources, one would obtain that all individuals behave exactly
in the same way when facing the same stimuli, but in the
experiments considered here this is not the case. Instead, we used a
different decision rule called probability matching, that has been
experimentally observed in many species, from insects to humans
[49–55]. According to this rule an individual chooses each option
with a probability that is equal to the probability that it is the best
choice. Therefore, in our case the probability of going to y (Py), is
the same as the estimated probability that y is the best location
(P(Y jC,B)), so
Py~P(Y jC,B): ð11Þ
Probability matching does not maximize the amount of right
choices if we assume that the probabilities stay always the same,
but in many circumstances it can be the optimal behavior, such as
when there is competition for resources [56,57], when the
estimated probabilities are expected to change due to learning
[53,55], or for other reasons [53,58].
Finally, using Eqs. 10 and 11 we have that the probability that
the deciding individual goes to y is
Py~ 1za P
L
k~1
s
nk
k
 {1
: ð12Þ
The assumption of probability matching has the advantage that
the final expression for the decision in Eq. 12 is identical to the one
given by Bayesian estimation in Eq. 10, with no extra parameters.
Alternative decision rules could be noisy versions of the threshold
rule, but at the price of adding at least one extra parameter to
describe the noise. Also, decision rules might not depend on
estimation alone, but also on other factors or constraints. These
more complicated rules fall beyond the scope of this paper.
In the following sections, we particularize Eq. 12 to different
experimental settings to test its results against existing rich
experimental data sets that have previously been fitted to different
mathematical expressions [42,43].
Symmetric set-up
We first considered the simple case of two identical equidistant
sites, x and y, Fig. 1A. For a set-up made symmetric by
experimental design there is no true best option. But deciding
individuals must act, like for any other case, using only their
incomplete sensory data to make the best possible decision. Even
when non-social sensory data indicates no relevant difference
between the two sites, the social information can bias the
estimation of the best option to one of the two sites.
Using Eq. 12 and that the three possible behaviors are ‘go to x’
(bx), ‘go to y’ (by) and ‘remain undecided’ (bu), we obtain
Py~ 1za s
nx
x s
ny
y s
N{nx{ny
u
 {1
, ð13Þ
where nx and ny are the number of individuals that have already
chosen x and y, respectively, and Nz1 is the size of the group
containing our focal individual and other N animals. As the set-up
is symmetric, the sensory information available to the deciding
individual is the same for both options so P(X jC)~P(Y jC)
and then a~1 according to Eq. 4. Also, since indecision is
not related to any particular choice, symmetry imposes
P(bujX ,C)~P(bujY ,C), so indecision is not informative, su~1
(Eq. 9). For the other two behaviors, going to x (bx) and going to y
(by), Eq. 9 gives
sx~
P(bxjX ,C)
P(bxjY ,C)
sy~
P(byjX ,C)
P(byjY ,C)
:
ð14Þ
P(bxjX ,C) and P(byjY ,C) are the estimated probabilities of
making the right choice, that is, going to x when x is the best
option, or going to y when y is the best option. Since in this case
the sensory information is identical for both options, the
probability of making the correct choice must be the same for
both options, P(bxjX ,C)~P(byjY ,C). An analogous argument
Bayesian Collective Behavior
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holds for the incorrect choices, P(bxjY ,C)~P(byjX ,C), giving
sx~1=sy: ð15Þ
In cases in which sx~1=sy, we find it convenient to express
reliability more generally as
s:sx~1=sy, ð16Þ
which is the ratio of the probability of making the correct choice
and the probability of making a mistake, for both behaviors. Using
this definition and given that a~au~1, Eq. 13 reduces to
Py~ 1zs
{Dn
 {1
, ð17Þ
with the variable Dn:ny{nx. Eq. 17 describes a sigmoidal
function that is steeper the higher the higher the value of s
(Fig. 1B). Therefore, for very reliable behaviors (high s, meaning
individuals that are much more likely to make correct choices than
erroneous ones), Py grows fast with Dn and the deciding individual
then goes to y with high probability when taking into account the
behaviors of only very few individuals.
The behavior of the group is obtained by applying the decision
rule in Eq. 17 sequentially to each individual (see Methods). After
each behavioural choice, we update the number of individuals at x
and y, using the new nx and ny for the next deciding individual
(Fig. 1C, bottom). Repeating this procedure for all the individuals
in the group, we can compute the probability for each possible
final outcome of the experiment (Fig. 1C, top).
The relevance of the symmetric case is that the model has a
single parameter and a single variable, enabling a powerful
comparison against experimental data. We tested the model using
an existing rich data set of collective decisions in three-spined
sticklebacks [42], a shoaling fish species. This data set was
obtained using a group of Ntot fish choosing between two identical
refugia, one on their left and another one on their right (Fig. 2A),
equivalent to locations x and y in the model (Fig. 1A). At the start
of the experiment, mx (my) replica fish made of resin were moved
along lines on the left (right) towards the refugia (Fig. 2A). The
experimental results consisted on the statistics of collective
decisions between the two refugia for 19 different cases using
different group sizes Ntot =2, 4 or 8 and different numbers of
replicas going left and right, mx : my ={1:1, 2:2, 0:1, 1:2, 0:2, 1:3,
0:3} (Fig. 2B, blue histograms). To compare against these
experimental data, we calculated the probability of finding a
collective pattern applying the individual behavioural rule in Eq.
17 iteratively over each fish for the 19 experimental settings. We
found a good fit of the model to the experimental data using for
the 19 graphs the same value s~2:2 (Fig. 2B, red line). The model
is robust, with good fits in the interval s~2{4 (Fig. 3, red line).
Despite the simplicity of the behavioral rule in Eq. 17, it
reproduces the experimental results, including the dependence on
the total number of fish Ntot, even though the rule is independent
of this parameter, except for determining the range of possible
values of Dn. The dependence of the final distributions on Ntot
emerges from the application of the rule to the Ntot individuals in
the group, as is illustrated in Fig. 4. Each small box represents a
state of the system in which nx : ny fish have already decided to go
to x and y, respectively. The lines connecting each box with
another two boxes on top represent the decision made by the next
Figure 1. Model with individuals estimating which of two identical places is best. (A) Schematic diagram of individuals choosing between
two identical locations x and y when there are already nx (ny) individuals at x (y). (B) Probability of going to y as a function of the difference between
the number of individuals at y and x, Eq. 17. (C) Sequential application of the behavioural rule in Eq. 17 with s~2:5, for the simple case of a group of
two individuals (bottom). The width of the arrows is proportional to the probability of each transition. The 3 possible final configurations, with
different proportion of individuals going to y (0, 0.5 and 1), have different probabilities of taking place, with both fish together at x or y being more
probable than a group split (top).
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1002282.g001
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deciding individual, that takes the system to the next state. The
width of the lines is proportional to the probability of the decision.
As more individuals decide, the central states become less likely
simply because they accumulate more unlikely decisions. There-
fore, the U-shape or J-shape becomes more pronounced for larger
groups, even though the individual decision rule in Eq. 17 is
independent of the total number of individuals Ntot.
Group decision-making in three-spined sticklebacks shows a
single type of distribution in which probability is minimum at the
center and increases monotonically towards the edges, denoted
here as U-shaped distribution (or J-shaped when there is a bias to
one of the two options). However, the model in Eq. 17 also gives
two other types of distributions, Fig. 5A. For non-social behavior
(s~1) the histogram is bell-shaped due to combinatorial effects.
However, a bell-shape is also compatible with social animals for
a certain range of s and group size (white region on the bottom-
left of Fig. 5A). For higher values of s, the histograms are M-
shaped, with two maxima located between the center and the
sides (region coloured in black and blue in Fig. 5A). However, the
M shape becomes clear only with enough number of bins
because the drop in probability near the edge or at the center of
the distribution disappears when binning is too coarse,
producing a bell-shaped or U-shaped histogram, Fig. 5B. This
is an important practical issue, because the amount of data that
can be collected rarely allows for more than 5 bins. The
colorscale in Fig. 5A reflects the number of bins needed to
observe the M shape (black has been reserved for exactly 5 bins).
For high values of s, the histograms are U-shaped (white region
on the top of Fig. 5A). Also, all the M-region above the black
zone becomes of type U when the binning is too coarse.
An interesting prediction of our model is that, for a given
number of bins, the shape of the distribution of choices changes
with the number of decided individuals, and the dynamics of this
change depends on s. For high values of s, the probability is U-
Figure 2. Comparison between model and stickleback choices
in symmetric set-up. (A) Schematic diagram of symmetric set-up with
a group of sticklebacks (in black) choosing between two identical
refugia and with different numbers of replica fish (in red) going to x and
y. (B) Experimentally measured statistics of final configurations of fish
choices from 20 experimental repetitions [42] (blue histogram) and
results from the model in Eq. 17 in the main text (red line using
reliability parameter s~2:2; red region: 95% confidence interval; green
line with s~2:5). Different graphs correspond to different stickleback
group sizes and different number of replicas going to x and y.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1002282.g002
Figure 3. Goodness of fit for different values of the reliability
(s). Red: Symmetric case (plots in Fig. 2). Green: Case with different
replicas at each side (plots in Fig. 6. The ratios sr=sR are re-optimized for
each value of s). Blue: Asymmetric set-up with predator on one side
(plots in Fig. 7 ; Parameter a is re-optimized for each value of s). (A) Root
mean squared error between the data and the probabilities predicted
by the model. Grey dashed line shows the mean RMSE for the three
cases. The absolute values for each case depend on the shape of the
data and are not comparable, only the trends and the position of the
minima should be compared. (B) Logarithm of the probability that the
data come from the model. The height of each curve depends on the
number of data for each experiment, only the trend and the position of
the maxima should be compared. Grey dashed line shows the sum of
the three coloured lines, but shifted by 1000 so that it fits on the scale.
The peak of this global probability indicates the value of s that best fits
the three datasets (s~2:5).
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1002282.g003
Bayesian Collective Behavior
PLoS Computational Biology | www.ploscompbiol.org 5 November 2011 | Volume 7 | Issue 11 | e1002282
shaped from the beginning and becomes steeper as more
individuals decide (as is the case for the stickleback dataset),
Fig. 5C. For lower values of s, we observe M-shaped distributions
for the first individuals and then U-shaped ones when more
individuals decide, Fig. 5D. For even lower values of s, we observe
bell-shaped distributions for the first individuals, then M-shaped
and finally U-shaped, Fig. 5E,F.
Symmetric set-up with modified replicas of animals
An interesting modification of the experimental set-up consists
in using replicas of the animals that we can modify to potentially
alter their reliability estimated by the animals. We considered the
particular case, motivated by experiments in [43], of two types of
modified replicas with different characteristics (for example, fat or
thin), Fig. 6A. We considered 7 behaviors: ‘animal goes to x’ (bfx),
‘animal goes to y’ (bfy), ‘most attractive replica goes to x’ (bRx),
‘most attractive replica goes to y’ (bRy) ‘least attractive replica goes
to x’ (brx), ‘least attractive replica goes to y’ (bry), and ‘animal
remains undecided’ (bfu). The probability of going to y in Eq. 12
then reduces to
Py~ 1za s
nfx
fx s
nfy
fy s
nRx
Rx s
nRy
Ry s
nrx
rx s
nry
ry s
Nf{nfx{nfy
fu
 {1
, ð18Þ
where subindex ‘f’ refers to real fish and ‘R’ (‘r’) to replicas of the
most (least) attractive type. As in the previous section, symmetry
imposes that a~1 and sfu~1. It also imposes the following
relations between the reliability parameters, sf:sfx~1=sfy,
sR:sRx~1=sRy, sr:srx~1=sry. Therefore,
Py~ 1zs
{Dnf
f s
{DnR
R s
{Dnr
r
 {1
, ð19Þ
where Dnf:nfy{nfx, DnR:nRy{nRx and Dnr:nry{nrx. In the
particular case of only two different replicas, one going to x and
the other to y and for notational simplicity taking the convention
that the most (least) attractive replica goes to y (x), we have
DnR~1 and Dnr~{1. Therefore,
Py~ 1z
sr
sR
s
{Dnf
f
 {1
: ð20Þ
Note that the probability in Eq. 20 does not depend on sr and sR
separately, but only on their ratio. Therefore, in this case the model
uses only two parameters (sf and sr=sR). We compared the model
with the stickleback data set from [43], Fig. 6. The data in Fig. 6B has
a different type of replica pair in each row, so in principle we would fit
a different ratio sr=sR for each row. But note that the first three rows
correspond to experiments with the same three replicas (large,
medium and small), combined in different pairs. The same can be
Figure 4. Illustration of the decision-making process in the
model. Bottom: Decision-making process according to Eq. 17 (with
s~2:5). Time runs from bottom to top. Each box represents a state with
a given number of fish having already decided x or y (nx : ny). Each
state can lead to another two states in the following time step,
depending on whether the focal fish decides to go to x or y. The width
of the lines connecting states is proportional to the probability of that
transition (equal to the probability of the prior state times the
probability of the focal fish making the decision that leads to the later
one). Top: Probability of each state after 8 fish have made their
decisions. (A) Case with no replicas, in which the final outcome is U-
shaped. (B) Case with one replica going to y (so initial state is already
0:1), in which the final outcome is J-shaped.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1002282.g004
Figure 5. Types of distributions and dynamics for different
values of reliability parameter s and group size. (A) Shape of
histogram of final configurations as a function of s and the group size.
Bell-shaped: white region on the bottom-left. M-shaped: region
coloured in black and blue. As the observation of the M shape depends
on the number of bins, the colorscale reflects the number of bins
needed to observe the M shape (black has been reserved for exactly 5
bins). U-shape: white region on the top. Also, all the M-region above the
black zone becomes U when the binning is too coarse. There is also a
small region below the black zone where the M shape becomes a bell
shape when the binning is too coarse. (B) Dependence of the apparent
shape on the number of bins: Top, 80 bins. Middle, 10 bins. Bottom, 5
bins. On the left, a probability that seems U-shaped for 5 bins, but is M
shaped for a higher number of bins. On the right, a probability that
stays M-shaped for any number of bins. (C–F) Dynamics of the
probability as the number of individuals increases for (C) s~2, (D)
s~1:62, (E) s~1:35 and (F) s~1:05.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1002282.g005
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said for the second and third threesomes of rows. Therefore, there are
only two free parameters for each three rows. On the other hand, sf
should have the same value for all cases. The model again reproduces
the experimental results reported in reference [43], obtaining the best
fit for sf~2:9 (Fig. 6B). The result is robust, with good fits for
sf~2{4 (Fig. 3, green line) in accord with the value obtained for the
case shown in Fig. 2B.
Asymmetric set-up
We finally considered the case in which sites x and y are
different and the three behaviors are ‘go to x’ (bx), ‘go to y’ (by)
and ‘remain undecided’ (bu). Eq. 12 reduces to
Py~ 1za s
nx
x s
ny
y s
N{nx{ny
u
 {1
: ð21Þ
The term a~P(X jC)=P(Y jC) represents the non-social informa-
tion and in general a=1 because the set-up is asymmetric by
design. This asymmetry might also affect how a deciding animal
takes into account the behaviours of other animals depending on
which side they chose, making in general sx=1=sy. Also,
indecision might be informative. For example, if non-social
information indicates the possible presence of a predator at y,
the indecision of other animals might confirm this to the deciding
individual, further biasing the decision towards x. Therefore, we
may have su=1. But it may also be the case that the set-up’s
asymmetry does not affect the social terms, so we also tested a
simpler model in which s:sx~1=sy and su~1, giving
Py~ 1za s
{Dn
 {1
: ð22Þ
The stickleback dataset reported in reference [42] is ideally
suited to test the asymmetric model for the experiments that were
performed with a replica predator at the right arm (Fig. 7A). The
model in Eq. 22 fits best the data with s~2:6 (Fig. 7B) and it is
robust with a good fit in s~2{4 (Fig. 3, blue line). The more
complex model in Eq. 21 gives fits very similar to those of simpler
model. Specifically, parameter su was rejected by the Bayes
Information Criterion [59,60], suggesting that fish do not rely on
undecided individuals. The fact that fish rely differently on other
fish depending on the option they have taken could not be ruled
out by the Bayes Information Criterion, but in any case the impact
of this difference on the data is small.
In the experiments in Fig. 2 and Fig. 7, we have assumed that
the replicas are perceived by fish as real animals. However, it is
reasonable to think that fish might perceive the difference, and rely
differently on replicas and real fish. To test this, we considered
different behaviors for fish and replicas, such as ‘fish goes to x’ and
‘replica goes to x’. Making that distinction, we get that Eq. 12
reduces to
Py~ 1za s
nfx
fx s
nfy
fy s
nrx
rx s
nry
ry s
Nf{nfx{nfy
fu
 {1
: ð23Þ
The Bayes Information Criterion rejects only parameter sfu.
However, the addition of the new parameters that distinguish
replica from real fish give very small improvements in the fits
compared to results of the simpler models in Eq. 17 and Eq. 22
(see Fig. S1 and S3), suggesting that fish follow replicas as much as
they follow real fish.
Model including dependencies
In this section we will remove the hypothesis of independence
among the behaviors of the other individuals (Eq. 6). We now
consider that the focal individual not only takes into account the
behaviors of the other animals at the time of decision but the
specific sequence of decisions that has taken place before, fbigK{1i~1 ,
being K{1 the number of individuals that have decided before
the focal one. For example, the sequence fx,yg may give different
information to the focal individual than the sequence fy,xg. This
Figure 6. Comparison between model and stickleback choices
with two differently modified replicas. (A) Schematic diagram of
symmetric set-up with a group of sticklebacks (in black) choosing
between two identical refugia and with one replica fish going to x and
a different one (in size, shape or pattern) going to y (in red). (B)
Experimentally measured statistics of final configurations of fish choices
from 20 experimental repetitions [43] (blue histogram) and results from
model in Eq. 20 in the main text (red line using reliability parameter
sf~2:9 and sr=sR = 0.35, 0.7, 0.5, 0.52, 0.69, 0.75, 0.43, 0.55, 0.78, 0.43,
for each row from top to bottom; red region: 95% confidence interval;
green line with sf~2:5 and same ratios sr=sR as for red line). Different
graphs correspond to different stickleback group sizes and different
types of replicas going to x and y.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1002282.g006
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is illustrated in Fig. 8A, where there are two possible paths leading
to states labeled as 1:1, but these two states are in different
branches of the tree (in contrast with Fig. 4, in which these two
states were collapsed in a single one).
To calculate the probability of the observed sequence of
behaviors provided that Y is the correct choice,
P(fbigK{1i~1 jY ,CK ), ð24Þ
one can apply P(A,B)~P(AjB)P(B) repeatedly to obtain
P(fbigK{1i~1 jY ,CK )~ P
K{1
k~1
P(bkjY ,CK ,fbigk{1i~1 ): ð25Þ
This expression substitutes the assumption of independence in Eq.
6. Each of the terms in the product is simply the probability that
the k{th individual makes its decision, given the previous
decisions, and also given that y is the correct choice. This result
was expected since if we look at the tree in Fig. 8A we see that the
probability of reaching a given state is simply the product of the
probabilities of choosing the adequate branches in each step.
So the problem reduces to computing the individual decision
probabilities P(bkjY ,CK ,fbigk{1i~1 ). We assume in the following
that these probabilities are calculated by the focal individual by
assuming that all animals use the same rules to make a decision.
The rule for the focal individual is, as in previous sections,
PyK~P(Y jfbigK{1i~1 ,CK )~
1
1zaKSK
, ð26Þ
where the non-social and social terms are
aK~
P(X jCK )
P(Y jCK ) , ð27Þ
and
SK~
P(fbigK{1i~1 jX ,CK )
P(fbigK{1i~1 jY ,CK )
, ð28Þ
respectively, and where we have added subscript K to S, a and C
to reflect that they apply to the focal individual, that makes its
decision in the K{th place.
The assumption that all animals apply the same rules translates
into the following. To apply an equation like Eq. 26 but on a
different individual (say, individual k) it is necessary to know the
non-social information Ck. Remember that all these computations
are made from the point of view of the focal individual, and
obviously the focal individual does not have access to the non-
social information of the other individuals. It may seem reasonable
for the focal animal to assume that all the other individuals have
the same non-social information (CK ), but this would result in no
social behavior at all (if the other individuals have the same non-
social information, their behaviors will not give any extra
information). Instead, one can assume that the other individuals
may have a different non-social information, C’. Furthermore, this
non-social information depends on which is the best choice,
because if for example x is the best choice the other individuals
have some probability of detecting it, and therefore their non-
social information will be on average biased towards x. We
Figure 7. Comparison between model and stickleback choices
in asymmetric set-up. (A) Schematic diagram of asymmetric set-up
(predator at y, large fish depicted in red) with a group of sticklebacks (in
black) choosing between two refugia, and replica fish (small fish
depicted in red) going to y. (B) Experimentally measured statistics of
final configurations of fish choices from 20 experimental repetitions [42]
(blue histogram) and results from model in Eq. 22 in the main text (red
line using s~2:6, a~9:5; red region: 95% confidence interval. Green
line using s~2:5 and same a as for red line). Different graphs
correspond to different stickleback group sizes and different number of
replicas going to y.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1002282.g007
Figure 8. Model taking into account dependencies. (A) Decision-
making process according to the model with dependencies, Eq. 25–33.
Time runs from bottom to top. Each box represents one state, and each
edge represents one option of the deciding individual, that either goes
to x or to y. Edge width is proportional to the probability of the
decision. (B) Probability of choosing y as a function of the difference of
the number of individuals that have already chosen each option
(Dn~ny{nx), for a’X~5. In the new model the probability does not
depend any more on Dn alone, so states with the same Dn have
different values for the probability (black dots). The area of the dots is
proportional to the probability of observing each state. Red line shows
the expected value of the probability for each value of Dn. The green
line shows the probability for the model that neglects dependencies
(Eq. 17), 1zs{Dn
 {1
for s~2:5.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1002282.g008
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approximate this average bias by assuming that, if x (y) is the best
choice, all the other individuals will have non-social information
C’X (C’Y ) that will bias the decision towards x (y). It is therefore
the same to assume that x (y) is the best option as to assume that all
the other individuals have non-social information C’X (C’Y ).
Therefore, for the probabilities of individual behaviors in Eq. 25,
we have that
P(bkjY ,CK ,fbigk{1i~1 )~P(bkjC’Y ,CK ,fbigk{1i~1 ), ð29Þ
where now c’Y applies to the k{th individual, so we can compute
this probability simply by applying Eq. 26 to the k{th individual,
Pyk ,Y~
1
1za’YSk
, ð30Þ
where
a’Y~
P(X jC’Y )
P(Y jC’Y ) : ð31Þ
Then, if we denote Pbk ,Y:P(bkjC’Y ,CK ,fbig
k{1
i~1 ), we have that
Pbk ,Y~Pyk ,Y if bk~y
Pbk ,Y~1{Pyk ,Y if bk~x:
(
ð32Þ
These are the individual probabilities needed in Eq. 25, that takes
into account the correlations among the other individuals. So we
can already calculate Sk using Eq. 28,
Sk~
Pk{1i~1 Pbi ,X
Pk{1i~1 Pbi ,Y
, ð33Þ
Eqs. 30 and 33 have a recursive relation, because we need the
probabilities up to step k{1 to compute Sk, and then we need Sk
to compute the probabilities in step k. At the beginning no
individual has made any choices, so we start with S1~1 and work
recursively from there until we obtain the probabilities for
individual K{1, that allow to compute SK . Then, we can already
use Eq. 26 to compute the decision probability of the focal
individual, this time using its actual non-social term aK (which is 1
for the symmetric cases, and fitted to the data in the non-
symmetric case).
The equations above constitute the model taking into account
dependencies. The new parameters of this model are a’X and a’Y ,
which substitute sx and sy in the previous models, so the number
of parameters is exactly the same. In the symmetrical case we must
have that a’X~1=a’Y , so the model has a single parameter. For
the non-symmetrical case these parameters may be independent of
each other, but we find good results even assuming that they are
not, as was the case for the simplified model. So for simplicity we
always assume that
a’X~1=a’Y : ð34Þ
For the case with different replicas at each side, each of them has a
different value of a’X , thus making one replica more attractive
than the other.
The new model also matches very well with the experimental
data discussed in this paper. Results for the case of two different
replicas are shown in Fig. 9, for the symmetric case in Fig. S4 and
for the case with predator in Fig. S5. Fits are robust, and all cases
are well explained by the model with the same value of a’X~5,
Fig. S6. See Figs. S1, S2, S3 for a comparison of all models.
We now ask how different is the model including dependencies
from the model that neglects them. To compare the two models,
we plot the probability of going to y as a function of Dn~ny{nx
for the new model, as we did in Fig. 1B for the old one. The
Figure 9. Comparison between model including dependencies
and stickleback choices with two differently modified replicas.
(A) Schematic diagram of symmetric set-up with a group of sticklebacks
(in black) choosing between two identical refugia and with one replica
fish going to x and a different one (in size, shape or pattern) going to y
(in red). (B) Experimentally measured statistics of final configurations of
fish choices from 20 experimental repetitions [43] (blue histogram) and
results from model that takes dependencies into account (red line, with
a’X ,fish~4:8 and a’X ,replicas = 21.4, 11.8, 0.6, 9.9, 4.8, 0.9, 13, 8, 0.7, 14.5,
0.9, for each type of replica (large, medium, small, fat, etc.); red region:
95% confidence interval; green line with a’X ,f ish~5 and same a’X ,replicas
as for red line). Different graphs correspond to different stickleback
group sizes and different types of replicas going to x and y.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1002282.g009
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inclusion of dependencies has the consequence that the probability
of going to y does not depend only on Dn, since now different
states with the same Dn may have different probabilities.
Therefore, when we plot the probability of going to y as a
function of Dn we obtain different values of the probability for
each value of Dn. This is shown by the black dots in Fig. 8B, where
the size of the dots is proportional to the probability of observing
each state when starting from 0:0. The red line shows the average
probability for each Dn, taking into account the probability of each
state. Both the dots and this line correspond to a’X~5, which is
the one that fits best the data. The green line corresponds to the
probability for the simplest model neglecting dependencies, with
the value that best fits to the data (s~2:5). This line is close to the
mean probability for the new model and to the values with highest
probability of occurrence, so the simple model is as a good
approximation to the model with dependencies.
We find an interesting prediction of the new model: There are
some states in which the most likely option is to choose the option
chosen by fewer individuals (for example, note in Fig. 8D that some
points with Dnv0 are above 0.5). This surprising result comes
from the fact that, as more fish accumulate at one side, their
choices become less and less informative (because it is very likely
that they are simply following the others). If then one fish goes to
the opposite side, its behavior is very informative, because it is
contradicting its social information. This effect can be so strong
that it may beat the effect of all the other individuals, resulting in a
higher probability of following this last individual than all the
individuals that decided before.
Discussion
We have shown that probabilistic estimation in the presence of
uncertainty can explain collective animal decisions. This approach
generated a new expression for each experimental manipulation,
Eq. 17–22, and was naturally extended to test for more refined
cognitive capacities, Eq. 23. The model was found to have a good
correspondence with the data in three experimental settings
(Figs. 2, 6 and 7), always giving a good fit with the social reliability
parameter s in the interval 2–4. Indeed, all the data have a very
good fit with s~2:5 (Figs. 2, 6 and 7, green lines). According to
Eq. 9, this value for s has the interpretation that, for the behaviors
relevant for these experiments, the fish assume that their
conspecifics make the right choice 2.5 times more often than the
wrong choice.
For the data used in this paper, previous empirical fits used
more parameters [42] (Figs. S1, S2, S3, blue line), and added more
complex behavioral rules when the basic model failed [43] (Fig.
S2, blue line). Our approach thus gains in simplicity. It also finds
an expression for each set-up with expressions for complex set-ups
obtained with add-ons to those of simpler set-ups, making the
model scalable and easier to understand in terms of simpler
experiments. Also, taking the models as fits to experimental data,
the bayesian information criterion finds our models to be better
than those in [42] and [43] (see captions in Figs. S1, S2, S3 for
details).
Collective animal behavior has been subject to a particularly
careful quantitative analysis. Previous studies have given descrip-
tions led by the powerful idea that complex collective behaviors
can emerge from simple individual rules. In fact, some systems
have been found empirically to obey rules that are mathematically
similar or the same as some of the ones presented in this paper,
further supporting the idea that probabilistic estimation might
underlie collective decision rules in many species. For example, a
function like the one in Eq. 17 has been used to describe the
behavior of Pharaoh’s ant [61], a function like Eq. 22 for mosquito
fish [62], and a function like the one in the right-hand-side of Eq.
22 for meerkats [63]. But despite the importance of group
decisions in animals, little is known about the origin of such simple
individual rules. This paper argues that probabilistic estimation
can be an underlying substrate for the rules explaining collective
decisions, thus helping in their evolutionary explanation. Also, this
connection between patterns in animal collectives and a cognitive
process helps to explain the similarities that exist between decision-
making processes at the level of the brain and at the level of animal
collectives [64,65].
Our model is naturally compatible with other theories that use a
Bayesian formalism to study different aspects of behavior and
neurobiology, thus contributing to a unified approach of
information processing in animals. For example, it may be
combined with the formalism of Bayesian foraging theory [18],
through an expansion of the non-social reliability a. Related to this
case, a very well studied example of use of social information is the
one in which one individual can observe directly the food collected
by another individual [29–33]. In this case the social information is
as unambiguous as the non-social one, so in this case both types of
information should have a similar mathematical form [29–33].
This is consistent with our model, that in this case will give a
similar expression for a and S. Other kinds of social information
(such as another individual’s decision to leave a food patch or
choices of females in mating [41]) would enter naturally in our
reliability terms sk. In discussing these and similar problems, it has
been proposed that animals should use social information when
their personal information is poor, and ignore it otherwise
[25,26,41]. Our model provides a quantitative framework for this
problem, predicting that social information is always used, only
with different weights with respect to other sources of information.
Bayesian estimation is also a prominent approach to study
decisions in neurobiology and psychology [3–17] and it would
be of interest to explore the mechanisms and role played by the
multiplicative relation between non-social and social terms.
Our approach also makes a number of predictions. For
example, it derives the probability of choosing among M options
(see Eq. S16 of the Text S1), that for the symmetric case reduces to
Pm~ 1z
XM
m=m
s{ nm{nmð Þ
 !{1
, ð35Þ
predicted also to fit the data for cases with Mw2 options.
We also predict a quantitative link between estimation and
collective behavior. The parameters a and sk in our model are in
fact not merely fitting parameters, but true experimental variables.
Manipulations of a and sk should allow to test that changes in
collective behavior follow the predictions of the model. A
counterintuitive prediction about the manipulation of sk is that
external factors unrelated to the social component can nevertheless
modify it. For example, a fish that usually finds food in a given
environment should interpret a sudden turn of one of his mates as
an indication that it has found food, and therefore will follow it. In
contrast, another fish that is not expected to find food in that
environment will not interpret the sudden turn as indicative of
food, and will not follow. Thus, the model predicts that the a priori
probability of finding food (to which each fish can be trained in
isolation) will modify its propensity to follow conspecifics. An
alternative approach that would not need manipulation of the
reliabilities sk would consist in showing that the probability of
copying a behavior increases with how reliably the behavior
informs about the environment.
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We can also extend the estimation model to use, instead of the
location of animals, their predicted location. We would then find
expressions like the ones in this paper but for the number or
density of individuals estimated for a later time. Consider for
example the case without non-social information, described in Eq.
17 for two options and in Eq. 35 for more options. We can rewrite
these equations as Pm~Vs
nm with m one of the options and V is the
normalization, V~
PM
m~1 s
nm , whereM is the number of options.
Then, we would have P(~x)~Vsr(~x;tzDt) for the continuous case
using prediction. Future positions at times tzDt (where Dt does
not need to be constant) in terms of variables at present time t
would be given by~xz~vDt for animals moving at constant velocity
~v. Consider then a simple case of an animal located at ~x and
estimating the future position of a compact group at ~xg and
moving with velocity~vg. The deciding animal would be predicted
to move with a high probability in the direction
~xg(t){~x(t)
 
zDt~vg(t). Estimation of future locations thus
naturally predicts in this simple case a particular form of
‘attraction’ and ‘alignment’ forces of dynamical empirical models
[46,66] as attraction to future positions, but in the general also
deviations from these simple rules.
Methods
Obtaining group behavior from the model of an
individual
The estimation rules presented in this paper refer to a single
individual. To simulate the behavior of a group, we use the
following algorithm: The current individual decides between x and
y. After the decision, we recompute the relevant parameters of the
model and use the new values for the next deciding individual.
The undecided individuals are only those that are waiting for their
turn to decide. We tested an alternative implementation in which
individuals may remain undecided or in which two individuals can
decide simultaneously, obtaining no relevant differences.
For the case of the model including dependencies, the model
always starts at state 0:0, with S~1. Most experiments have initial
conditions in which several replicas are already going to either
side, and the fish have no information about the path followed to
reach this state. In these cases, we average the probabilities of all
the paths that might have possibly led to the initial state to
compute the initial value of S.
Protocol S1 and Protocol S2, contain Matlab functions that run the
models (extensions of the files must be changed from .txt to .m to
make them operative). Protocol S1 corresponds to the model
without dependencies, and Protocol S2 corresponds to the model
with dependencies. These functions have been used to generate all
the theoretical results presented in this paper.
Fits
We computed log likelihood as the logarithm of the
probability that the histograms come from the model. We
searched for the model parameters giving a higher value of log
likelihood, corresponding to a better fit. This search was
performed by optimizing each parameter separately (keeping
the rest constant) and iterating through all parameters until
convergence. In all cases convergence was rapidly achieved. We
performed multiple searches for best fitting parameters starting
from random initial conditions and always found convergence to
the same values, suggesting there are no local maxima. Indeed,
we observed that log-likelihood is smooth and with a single
maximum in all the cases with 1 or 2 parameters (see Fig. 3 for
an example).
Bayesian Information Criterion
For model comparison we used the Bayesian Information
Criterion (BIC) [59,60], which takes into account both goodness of
fit and the number of parameters. According to this criterion,
among several models that have been fitted to maximize log
likelihood, one should select the one for which
BICi~Li{
1
2
ki log (h) ð36Þ
is largest, where Li is the logarithm of the probability that the data
comes from the i{th model once its parameters have been
optimized to maximize this probability, ki is its number of
parameters of the i{th model and h is the number of
measurements (which in our case is the same for all models).
More intuitive than the direct BICi values in Eq. 36 are the BIC
weights, defined as [60]
wi~
exp (BICi)P
j
exp (BICj)
, ð37Þ
when we assume that all models are a priori equally likely. Roughly
speaking, wi can be interpreted as the probability that model i is
the most correct one [60].
We used BIC to compare different versions of our model, and
also to compare our model with those of references [42,43] (see
Figs. S1, S2, S3). The models of refs. [42,43] were originally fitted
by minimizing the mean squared error instead of by maximizing
logprob. For this reason, they score very poorly in BIC with their
reported parameters. For this reason, we re-optimized for
maximum logprob all their model parameters (these parameters
are, using the notation of refs. [42,43], a, k, T , m and r, with r
only applicable in the case of predator present). For the case of
different replicas going to each side, parameter pbias takes a
different value for each row in the figure, adding up to 10
parameters. The model in ref. [43] is computationally expensive,
so it is not feasible to re-optimize these many parameters.
Therefore, we treated them as if they were independently
measured: we fixed pbias in each case so that the results of the
trials with a single individual matched exactly the model’s
prediction (as reported in [43]). We also followed this procedure
with the ratios sr=sR of our model without dependencies, and the
pairs a’X ,replicas in our model with dependencies. Then, we
performed BIC taking into account neither these parameters (pbias
the ratios sr=sR and the pairs a’X ,replicas) nor the data from trials
using single individuals.
Supporting Information
Figure S1 Comparison between different models for the
symmetric set-up. Experimentally measured statistics of final
configurations of fish choices from 20 experimental repetitions
[42] (blue histograms). Red line: results from our single-parameter
model assuming independence in Eq. 17 in the main text (s~2:2).
Green line: Enhanced model assuming independence with
different reliability for the replicas (sf~3, sr~1:76). Yellow line:
Model including dependencies (a’X~4:9). Blue line: Empirical
model presented in Ref. [42], using the parameters reported there.
Different graphs correspond to different stickleback group sizes
and different number of replicas going to x and y. According to
Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC, see Methods), the best model
is our model with dependencies (yellow line, logprob L~{394,
and BIC weight w~0:996. Second-best is the complicated version
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of the model without dependencies (green line, logprob L~{396,
and BIC weight w~0:004). Third-best is our one-parameter
model assuming independence (red line, L~{419, w~3:10{11).
And last (but not far from the third one) the model from Ref. [42]
(blue line, L~{411 w~5:10{13). For the model from Ref. [42],
L and w correspond to a re-optimization of the model as described
in Methods, because using the parameters reported in [42] would
perform worse).
(TIF)
Figure S2 Comparison between different models for the
condition with two different replicas. Experimentally
measured statistics of final configurations of fish choices from 20
experimental repetitions [43] (blue histograms). Red line: results
from model in Eq. 20 in the main text (sf~2:9, sr=sR =0.35, 0.7,
0.5, 0.52, 0.69, 0.75, 0.43, 0.55, 0.78, 0.43 for each row from top
to bottom). Yellow line: Model including dependencies (a’X~4:8,
a’X ,replicas =21.4, 11.8, 0.6, 9.9, 4.8, 0.9, 13, 8, 0.7, 14.5, 0.9 for
each type of replica (large, medium, small, etc.). Blue line:
Empirical model presented in Ref. [43], using the parameters
reported there. Different graphs correspond to different stickleback
group sizes and different types of replicas going to x and y.
According to Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC, see Methods),
our model neglecting dependencies gives the best representation of
the data (red line, logprob L~{783, and BIC weight
w~0:9985). Second-best is out model including dependencies,
(L~{788, w~0:001). Last, but near the second one, is the model
from ref. [43] (blue line, L~{781 w~0:0005. For the model
from Ref. [43], these values of L and w correspond to a re-
optimization of the model as described in Methods, because using
the parameters reported in [43] would perform worse). The values
of logprob (L) reported here do not include the data of the single-
individual experiments (see Methods).
(TIF)
Figure S3 Comparison between different models in the
asymmetrical set-up. Experimentally measured statistics of
final configurations of fish choices from 20 experimental
repetitions [42] (blue histograms). Red line: results from model
neglecting dependencies in Eq. 22 in the main text (s~2:6,
a~9:5). Green line: Enhanced model neglecting dependencies
with different reliability for the fish going to different locations and
for the replicas (a~5:5, sfx~50, sfy~2=3, sry~0:36. srx has no
effect because there are no replicas going to x). Yellow line: Two-
parameter model including dependencies (a~9:94, a’X~8:66).
Blue line: Empirical model presented in Ref. [42], using the
parameters reported there. Different graphs correspond to
different stickleback group sizes and different number of replicas
going to y. According to Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC, see
Methods), the best two models are our complicated version
neglecting dependencies (green line, logprob L~{225, and
BIC weight w~0:52) and our two-parameter model including
dependencies (yellow line, L~{231, w~0:38). Next (but very
near) is our simplified model (red line, L~{232, w~0:098). And
last (and significantly worse) the model from Ref. [42] (blue line,
L~{234 w~2:5:10{6. For the model from Ref. [42], the values
of L and w correspond to a re-optimization of the model as
described in Methods, because using the parameters reported in
[42] would perform worse. In two of the graphs for group size 1
that there are no data the prediction of the model from Ref. [42]
and our model (especially the simplest version) are opposite. It
might be that the results changed completely, depending on the
results of these graphs, were the experiments performed. But we
found that this is not the case: We performed simulations, adding
experimental data in these two graphs. Even in the extreme case
that the fabricated results matched exactly the predictions of the
model in Ref. [42], BIC would still favour two of our models (we
would get L~{254, w~0:99 for our model with dependence,
L~{252, w~0:01 for our complicated model neglecting
dependence, L~{268, w~8:10{7 for our simplified model
neglecting dependence and L~{258, w~3:10{6 for the model
in [42]).
(TIF)
Figure S4 Comparison between model including depen-
dencies and stickleback choices in symmetric set-up. (A)
Schematic diagram of symmetric set-up with a group of
sticklebacks (in black) choosing between two identical refugia
and with different numbers of replica fish (in red) going to x and y.
(B) Experimentally measured statistics of final configurations of fish
choices from 20 experimental repetitions [42] (blue histogram) and
results from the model that takes into account dependencies (red
line using a’X~4:9; red region: 95% confidence interval; green
line with a’X~5). Different graphs correspond to different
stickleback group sizes and different number of replicas going to
x and y.
(TIF)
Figure S5 Comparison between model including depen-
dencies and stickleback choices in asymmetric set-up. A)
Schematic diagram of asymmetric set-up (predator at y, large fish
depicted in red) with a group of sticklebacks (in black) choosing
between two refugia, and replica fish (small fish depicted in red)
going to y. (B) Experimentally measured statistics of final
configurations of fish choices from 20 experimental repetitions
[42] (blue histogram) and results from the model that takes into
account the dependencies (red line using a’X~8:7, a~9:9; red
region: 95% confidence interval. Green line using a’X~5 and
a~6:28). Different graphs correspond to different stickleback
group sizes and different number of replicas going to y.
(TIF)
Figure S6 Goodness of fit of the model including
dependencies for different values of a’X . Red: Symmetric
case (data in Fig. S4). Green: Case with different replicas at each
side (data in Fig. 9. The parameters a’X ,replicas are re-optimized for
each value of a’X ). Blue: Asymmetric set-up with predator on one
side (data in Fig. S5; Parameter a is re-optimized for each value of
a’X ). (A) Root mean squared error between the data and the
probabilities predicted by the model. Grey dashed line shows the
mean RMSE for the three cases. The absolute values for each case
depend on the shape of the data and are not comparable, only the
trends and the position of the minima should be compared. (B)
Logarithm of the probability that the data come from the model.
The height of each curve depends on the number of data for each
experiment, only the trend and the position of the maxima should
be compared. Grey dashed line shows the sum of the three
coloured lines, but shifted by 1000 so that it fits on the scale. The
peak of this global probability indicates the value of a’X that best
fits the three datasets (a’X~5).
(TIF)
Protocol S1 Algorithm for the model that neglects
dependencies. This file contains Matlab code that runs the
model without dependencies. Please, change extension from .txt to
.m to make it operative. It can be run without any input argument.
Once the extension is changed to .m, simply type ProtocolS1 in
Matlab’s command window to get results for default parameters.
Documentation is given inside the file. Type help ProtocolS1 in
Matlab’s command window to see the documentation.
(TXT)
Bayesian Collective Behavior
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Protocol S2 Algorithm for the model that takes depen-
dencies into account. This file contains Matlab code that runs
the model with dependencies. Please, change extension from .txt to
.m to make it operative. It can be run without any input argument.
Once the extension is changed to .m, simply type ProtocolS2 in
Matlab’s command window to get results for default parameters.
Documentation is given inside the file. Type help ProtocolS2 in
Matlab’s command window to see the documentation.
(TXT)
Text S1 Derivation of the model with more options. This
file contains the derivation of the model for the more general case of
M different options (instead of only 2, as presented in the main text).
(PDF)
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